What is Recruitment?

An intelligence definition of recruitment is the attainment of someone's cooperation to provide intelligence, usually after careful assessment and patient cultivation of the target by the intelligence service. By the time the "pitch" (the offer to work for the foreign government) is made, the intelligence officer (the "recruiter") is relatively confident of the target's willingness to cooperate.

If a failed recruitment attempt is reported, serious consequences may result for the foreign intelligence service officer. An involved Intelligence Officer who has diplomatic status may be declared persona non grata and expelled from the country; one without such status could face trial and imprisonment, if convicted.

If the target agrees to the recruitment, that person becomes an "asset" or "agent", i.e. he has become a spy. The Intelligence Officer, also called a "case officer," handles the asset by clandestinely receiving the intelligence, paying his agent, and guiding the asset in his illicit activities.

Why a person would betray his country is a complex issue, but money is almost always involved. Pursuit of financial gain often represents some other personal or psychological need such as ego enhancement, revenge, etc.

The Threat

The mainstay of most intelligence services the world over is the recruitment of well-placed assets who can provide insightful intelligence on a particular issue(s). Most sensitive jobs are of special interest to foreign intelligence services.

Despite the number of Americans who have initiated their own espionage careers and have volunteered to provide information to other countries, foreign intelligence services continue to invest considerable time and resources in assessing and targeting U.S. citizens for recruitment approaches. These approaches are almost never made impulsively, but are actually the end result of detailed planning and thorough assessment of the target. By the time the target is asked to work for a foreign intelligence service, the person is probably aware that a dubious relationship is developing.

This portion of the briefing is intended to help sensitize you to targeting by foreign intelligence services, assist you in recognizing and countering recruitment attempts, and advise you to immediately report any incident or questionable relationship. Your contribution to the collective security of the University of California, the U.S. Department of Energy, or the U.S. Department of Defense of the nation is vital.

Damage Potential

Indisputably, those Americans who have betrayed their country, regardless of whether they volunteered or were recruited to spy, have caused immeasurable damage to the security of the citizens of the United States. In some cases, lives were lost. In others, lives were destroyed. In all cases, lives were irreparably altered.

Americans who have spied have betrayed a special trust to the country, to their friends and colleagues, and to their families. Despite their personal rationale for their treason all had other means that were appropriate for fulfilling their aspirations, needs, and desires. Most, if not all spies, eventually regret their actions and their decisions to commit espionage.

No matter the circumstance, no matter what the motivations, working illicitly for a foreign intelligence service is indefensible and is never the right decision. Espionage is deceit, betrayal, manipulation, and results ultimately in destruction...

Reporting

Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-12 requires that government employees report all contact with individuals of any nationality, either within or outside the scope of the employees official activities, in which:

Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information. The employee is concerned that he/she may be the target of actual or attempted exploitation by a foreign entity.

Likewise, the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, paragraph 1-302b, states that "contractors shall report efforts by an individual, regardless of nationality, to obtain illegal or unauthorized access to classified information or to compromise a cleared employee. In addition, all contacts by cleared employees with known or suspected intelligence officers from any country, or any contact which suggests the employee concerned may be the target of an attempted exploitation by the intelligence services of another country, shall be reported."

Regardless of whether you are a cleared individual or not, the security of the nation rests on the prompt reporting of any suspicious contacts. If in doubt, contact your Facility Security Officer, unit CI office, or agency security office. The individuals staffing these offices can assess your information and determine if a potential CI concern exists. DOE Programs The Defense Nuclear Counter-Intelligence Officer DOE/OAK Servicing this area is: Steve Minniear Office: (925) 423-9872 Pager: (800) 784-1856 Steve.Minniear@oak.doe.gov

________________________

Summary

Recruitment is usually a subtle and carefully orchestrated process to determine a person's receptiveness to working for a foreign government. If success is perceived to be possible, the pitch will eventually be made. Initially, an intelligence officer's interest in you may be imperceptible, but may become more obvious as the relationship develops.

Reporting questionable relationships, whether involving yourself, a co-worker, supervisor, neighbor, family member, or friend, is crucial to effective intervention. Espionage is never a "victimless crime." It damages lives and threatens the security of this nation. Notify the nearest DSS office should you have any indication that you or one of your coworkers may be the target of an attempted exploitation by a representative of another country.

Reports of actual, probable, or possible espionage should be submitted to the FBI.

For additional information regarding foreign intelligence recruitment approaches and targeting, review the DSS CI Office's publications, "Technology Collection Trends in the US Defense Industry" and "Suspicious Indicators and Security Countermeasures for Foreign Collection Activities Directed Against the US Defense Industry." Additionally, articles can be viewed and downloaded from the DSS Internet site at http://www.dss.mil/cithreats/